Why is inflation in China so low?


One of the most discussed topics among investors recently is mainland China’s inflation rate. In May, the consumer price index rose by 0.2% year on year (YoY), much lower than the 4% YoY rise in the US and 6.1% in Europe. It is also lower than other emerging countries such as Indonesia (4%) and India (4.3%).

From an economic standpoint, the ideal level of inflation is generally around 2-3%. If inflation remains persistently high, it not only affects business investment sentiment but also impacts low-income individuals and those who rely on savings for their livelihoods. However, if inflation is too low, it increases the risk of deflation, which can lead to asset price declines and economic contraction. Moreover, since debt levels generally do not decrease, deflation significantly reduces borrowers’ repayment capacity and increases banks’ bad debt risks, which will weaken their willingness to lend.

While the rest of the world is grappling with inflation, why is China moving in the opposite direction, hovering on the edge of deflation? There are three possible reasons. First, as the world’s factory, intense competition among companies in China leads to a tendency for excessive investment in production capacity. When Western countries shifted their expenditure from goods consumption to service consumption after the pandemic, their import from China declined. Therefore, Chinese manufacturers face increasing challenges in utilizing their production capacity. Overcapacity naturally leads to deflationary pressure. Second, high energy price is a significant factor driving inflation in Europe and the US. However, China benefits from Western sanctions on Russian oil and it purchases oil from Russia at prices much lower than the international oil price. Third, Western countries exercised ultra-loose monetary policy during the pandemic to stimulate household consumption. In contrast, China’s stimulus policy was relatively reserved, resulting in much lower inflationary pressures compared to Western countries.

China’s current inflation rate is only 0.2%, almost negligible. The real concern for China is how to avoid falling into the deflation trap. In addition to the three factors mentioned above, deflationary pressure in the country is also partially due to insufficient domestic demand. In recent years, the central government has tightened economic controls for national security reasons and to reduce the economy’s reliance on real estate, indirectly affecting consumer confidence. Currently, people are more willing to save their money in banks rather than spend them. The ratio of household net savings to GDP, after deducting debt, has increased from 32% in early last year to 44% in March this year. Encouraging consumer spending is now the government’s top priority. In the early 21st century, the South Korean government encouraged credit card companies to relax their approval requirements to stimulate the economy and promote advanced consumer spending. Although it eventually led to a credit card repayment crisis, it showed that there are effective measures the government can take if it truly wants to promote consumption.

If consumer spending remains insufficient, reference can be made to the measures taken by the US in the 1930s and Japan in the 1990s to combat deflation. Both countries employed Keynesian economics by borrowing idle funds from the public through government intervention in the market and using them for infrastructure investments to drive economic growth. The Hoover Dam, located in the suburbs of Las Vegas, was built during this period. While infrastructure investments may not always generate sufficient momentum to bring the economy back on a growth trajectory, at the very least, they can help reduce the risk of the economy entering a vicious deflationary cycle.


Disclaimer

This document is based on management forecasts and reflects prevailing conditions and our views as of this date, all of which are accordingly subject to change. In preparing this document, we have relied upon and assumed without independent verification, the accuracy and completeness of all information available from public sources. All opinions or estimates contained in this document are entirely Zeal Asset Management Limited’s judgment as of the date of this document and are subject to change without notice.

Investments involve risks. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. You may lose part or all of your investment. You should not make an investment decision solely based on this information. Each Fund may have different underlying investments and be exposed to a number of different risk, prior to investing, please read the offering documents of the respective funds for details, including risk factors. If you have any queries, please contact your financial advisor and seek professional advice. This material is issued by Zeal Asset Management Limited and has not been reviewed by the Securities and Futures Commission in Hong Kong.

There can be no assurance that any estimates of future performance of any industry, security or security class discussed in this presentation can be achieved. The portfolio may or may not have current investments in the industry, security or security class discussed. Any reference or inference to a specific industry or company listed herein does not constitute a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold securities of such industry or company. Please be advised that any estimates of future performance of any industry, security or security class discussed are subject to change at any time and are current as of the date of this presentation only. Targets are objectives only and should not be construed as providing any assurance or guarantee as to the results that may be realized in the future from investments in any industry, asset or asset class described herein.

In respect of any discrepancy between the English and Chinese version, the English version shall prevail.

Three-horse carriage for growth in China: Where are they heading


Throughout the journey, the Chinese economy has been driven by three main engines: exports, investments, and consumption, which are also known as the three-horse carriage for growth. At present, where are these horses heading?

During the pandemic, lockdowns in Western countries hindered service consumption but led to a surge in online shopping, resulting in increased demand for consumer goods and reduced inventories. This, in turn, boosted robust export growth of China. However, as the pandemic gradually subsided since the beginning of last year, service consumption has started to recover, leading to a decreased demand in consumer goods. China’s exports last year were mainly for inventories restocking in Western countries since inventory levels were extremely low previously. According to data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, the inventory-to-sales ratio has returned to 1.39 by the end of March this year, approximately the pre-pandemic level. This signifies that the favorable environment for China’s exports over the past two years has essentially come to an end. Before the pandemic in 2019, China accounted for about 13% of global merchandise exports, which increased to 15% during the peak of the pandemic in 2021. If China’s export share returns to pre-pandemic levels, we may see a slight contraction in exports this year.

On the other hand, many investors are concerned about the long-term impact of geopolitical tensions and rising labor costs on China’s export competitiveness. It is undeniable that some companies are considering the “China plus one” strategy, which involves seeking an additional production base outside of China to reduce reliance on Chinese production. However, export data from the beginning of the year until April shows that China’s exports still grew by 2.5% year-on-year, while popular “China plus one” locations such as Vietnam, India, and Thailand experienced declines of 11.8%, 4.7%, and 2.2% respectively during the same period. What’s more, despite a 7.5% year-on-year decline in May’s exports, China’s cumulative exports still rose by 0.3% for this year as of May.

As for the second horse – investment, it is estimated that fixed asset investment growth will remain at a moderate level. Achieving a significant acceleration in investment is not easy, as the real estate sector has had a large share and it is difficult for other industries to immediately replace its contribution. However, data showed that the growth focus of fixed asset investment has shifted from real estate to other sectors, including automobile manufacturing and high-tech industries. Infrastructure investment has also shown some strengthening in growth. However, we noticed the lack of momentum within fixed asset investment of private enterprises, with a growth rate of only 0.9% for the entire year of 2022. In the first four months of this year, the growth rate further dipped to 0.4% year-on-year, far below the overall growth rate of fixed asset investment at 4.7%. We believe the weak fixed asset investment of private enterprises is partially due to the lack of confidence after the regulatory overhaul of Internet companies. While certain sub-sectors may lag, investment is overall gaining traction.

Lastly, in terms of consumption, it appears to be gradually improving. In the first five months of this year, the business activity index of the Chinese retail industry has shown monthly improvements and has remained above the boom-bust line for five consecutive months. The ratio of household net savings to GDP, after deducting debt, has increased from 32% in the beginning of last year to 44% in March of this year, indicating that people have the ability to consume, but they are currently adopting a conservative approach and are willing to save cash.

Overall, two of the three horses, exports and investments, are still building momentum and waiting for a breakthrough. While consumption is clearly evidencing strong growth potential and is positioned for further improvement.


Disclaimer

This document is based on management forecasts and reflects prevailing conditions and our views as of this date, all of which are accordingly subject to change. In preparing this document, we have relied upon and assumed without independent verification, the accuracy and completeness of all information available from public sources. All opinions or estimates contained in this document are entirely Zeal Asset Management Limited’s judgment as of the date of this document and are subject to change without notice.

Investments involve risks. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. You may lose part or all of your investment. You should not make an investment decision solely based on this information. Each Fund may have different underlying investments and be exposed to a number of different risk, prior to investing, please read the offering documents of the respective funds for details, including risk factors. If you have any queries, please contact your financial advisor and seek professional advice. This material is issued by Zeal Asset Management Limited and has not been reviewed by the Securities and Futures Commission in Hong Kong.

There can be no assurance that any estimates of future performance of any industry, security or security class discussed in this presentation can be achieved. The portfolio may or may not have current investments in the industry, security or security class discussed. Any reference or inference to a specific industry or company listed herein does not constitute a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold securities of such industry or company. Please be advised that any estimates of future performance of any industry, security or security class discussed are subject to change at any time and are current as of the date of this presentation only. Targets are objectives only and should not be construed as providing any assurance or guarantee as to the results that may be realized in the future from investments in any industry, asset or asset class described herein.

In respect of any discrepancy between the English and Chinese version, the English version shall prevail.