How will banks fare amid rising rates?


In the 15 years after the global financial crisis, the MSCI World Banks Index rose by 14%, a small fraction of the 195% in returns global stock indexes gained during the period. The difference in performance can be explained in part by the tightened regulations restricting banks’ ability to leverage their balance sheets to boost the rates of return for their shareholders. Combined with an increase in labour costs and capital reserves required to meet compliance standards, banks have had to raise their expenses, which impinged on their profitability. Falling interest rates worldwide have also been a factor that most would attribute to have impacted banks’ net interest incomes.

But would banks benefit from an increase in interest rates aimed at stamping out inflation? Before we get to the bottom of this, we think it makes sense to unpack the relationship between net interest rate spread and interest rate. According to a research report authored by economists from the Bank for International Settlements and the US Federal Reserve surveying more than 3,400 banks in 47 countries globally, a bank’s net interest rate spread will typically decrease alongside a drop in short-term interest rate (3-month Treasury bond yields). The narrowing effect on banks’ net interest rate spreads is also more evident in countries with lower interest rates than those with higher rates such that, in the former, banks’ net interest rate spreads will drop by as much as 17bp when the short-term interest rate is lowered by 1%. In the latter, however, a drop in short-term interest rate of the same degree will only reduce banks’ net interest rate spreads by 9bp. Banks in areas with higher interest rates should also have relatively higher returns on assets.

Clearly, in times of economic growth and rising interest rates, bank stocks generally make a prime investment opportunity: An increase in interest rates will widen banks’ net interest rate spreads and returns on assets, while economic growth will also stimulate demand for loans and reduce risks of bad debt – both conducive to the profitability of banks.

Having said that, despite the Fed hiking rates in the past few months, the S&P Bank ETF underperformed the broad market. This is contributed by economic uncertainties emerging across China, the US and Europe: The US, for one, saw its Q1 GDP drop by 1.4% YoY; Europe has also been confronted with recessionary pressure due to elevated natural gas prices resulting from the Russia-Ukraine conflicts; lastly, China’s battle against the pandemic will likely lead to a slowdown in consumption and export, potentially curbing its economic growth. With one of the two requisites missing, the time is perhaps yet to be ripe for banks’ outperformance.

What about the net interest rate spread in China, then? It certainly will require more than one round of regression analysis to untangle the correlation between net interest rate spreads and interest rates in China. The marketization of its interest rates only approached the final stages of completion in 2015, before which the net interest rate spreads were largely in the hands of the government, making deciphering the spread’s correlation with the rise and fall of interest rates difficult.

Only six years’ worth of data since 2016 is currently available – a dataset far from sufficiently populated from which to extract any concrete conclusion. However, when we compared China’s 3-month Treasury bond yields with the net interest rate spreads of China Construction Bank (CCB) and China Merchants Bank (CMB), some might notice what appeared to be a positive correlation where rises in interest rates led to the widening of net interest rate spreads. But such an observation would go against our analysis of changes in interest incomes and interest rates found in the annual reports of domestic banks in China: the numbers provided respectively in the 2021 annual reports of both CCB and CMB point to a decline in their net interest incomes when interest rates rose.

For investors on the prowl for specific banks that stand to benefit from interest rate rises, we think those in Hong Kong and overseas markets should be given higher priority over domestic Chinese banks. So far, the policy direction in China looks to be skewed towards lowering the interest rate, rather than increasing it; still, another uncertainty lies in exactly how a rise in interest rate, unlikely as it is, will affect the net interest rate spreads across domestic banks.


Disclaimer

This document is based on management forecasts and reflects prevailing conditions and our views as of this date, all of which are accordingly subject to change. In preparing this document, we have relied upon and assumed without independent verification, the accuracy and completeness of all information available from public sources. All opinions or estimates contained in this document are entirely Zeal Asset Management Limited’s judgment as of the date of this document and are subject to change without notice.

Investments involve risks. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. You may lose part or all of your investment. You should not make an investment decision solely based on this information. Each Fund may have different underlying investments and be exposed to a number of different risk, prior to investing, please read the offering documents of the respective funds for details, including risk factors. If you have any queries, please contact your financial advisor and seek professional advice. This material is issued by Zeal Asset Management Limited and has not been reviewed by the Securities and Futures Commission in Hong Kong.

There can be no assurance that any estimates of future performance of any industry, security or security class discussed in this presentation can be achieved. The portfolio may or may not have current investments in the industry, security or security class discussed. Any reference or inference to a specific industry or company listed herein does not constitute a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold securities of such industry or company. Please be advised that any estimates of future performance of any industry, security or security class discussed are subject to change at any time and are current as of the date of this presentation only. Targets are objectives only and should not be construed as providing any assurance or guarantee as to the results that may be realized in the future from investments in any industry, asset or asset class described herein.

China’s e-commerce companies: The challenges ahead


Having announced their 3Q21 earnings, both Alibaba and Pinduoduo saw their stock prices plummet. Upon thorough analysis of their quarterly reports and of JD.com’s, as well as their senior management’s earnings calls for analysts, we would like to share with you the latest development of China’s e-commerce industry.

As the Chinese government bolstered enforcement of its antitrust law, precipitating an upheaval that reverberated across the domestic e-commerce industry, multiple companies moved to ride on the opportunity to broaden their business into each other’s territory: Alibaba ramped up investments in Juhuasuan and Taote, while JD.com launched the new app Jingxi, with the objective to compete with Pinduoduo.

Pinduoduo, being part of the Tencent camp, used to have its competitive advantage sheltered by the tech giant, who restricted Alibaba to operate within its ecosystem before the antitrust crackdown, making it difficult for Alibaba to promote its products on WeChat. But with the anti-monopoly regulations coming into effect, Pinduoduo practically lost its unique position on the WeChat platform.

While Pinduoduo has grown rapidly over the past few years, where it surpassed Taobao in monthly active users, the e-commerce platform is nowhere as profitable as Alibaba. Whether Alibaba can take advantage of the antitrust law to overtake Pinduoduo is still yet to be seen, but the battle for the e-commerce space is set to intensify.

In addition to moves against Pinduoduo, Alibaba and JD.com have also stepped up their investments in live broadcasting. Short video platform newcomers, such as Kuaishou and Tiktok, have achieved tremendous success over the past two years. In addition to advertising revenue, the growth potential in live commerce cannot be ignored.

Short video platforms generally command a degree of stickiness among users that is comparable with that of WeChat. So if business models such as live commerce prove to be successful, it will also brighten the growth prospects for Alibaba and JD.com – no doubt live commerce will become a heated battlefield for market players. Having said that, the Chinese government has announced plans to tighten scrutiny over live commerce, so it is difficult for now to predict where the industry is headed.

This, however, is also an obstacle many investors in the internet industry encounter. Given that both competition and regulations have intensified, it leaves little visibility for investors over just how profitable the industry will be. But what is confirmed at present is that the costs of running e-commerce platforms have indeed gone up.

Rising cost concerns

While Alibaba is a highly diversified conglomerate – encompassing cloud computing, media, and entertainment businesses – all of these arms except for its e-commerce platform are still making a loss.

The cost of Alibaba’s e-commerce business soared significantly since the beginning of 2021, which the company attributed mainly to investments in new growth areas, including Juhuasuan, Taocaicai, AliExpress, the Southeast Asian arm Lazada, transportation business Cainiao, and subsidies for merchant users.

New expenditures like these reduced the EBITA Margin of its e-commerce business from 31% to 19% in 3Q21[1]. But it is not clear how much of it was allocated to support business growth and to actual subsidies for small- and micro-enterprises, given that the company did not elaborate on what merchant subsidies entailed.

As for Pinduoduo, marketing and sales costs have always made up the bulk of its operating costs, which at its peak stood above the company’s sales revenue. In Pinduoduo’s earnings call, the company indicated plans to reduce marketing and sales expenses, and will step up investments in technology research.

Strong marketing and sales expenses were believed to contribute sizeably to Pinduoduo’s expansion, so when its 3Q21 sales growth missed market expectations, it sowed seeds of concerns among investors that the drop in such expenses had started to hit Pinduoduo. 4Q usually is the strongest quarter of the year, we think investors should stay put and see how the company performs in the last quarter of 2021.

The board of Pinduoduo has also just given the green light to allocate RMB10 billion to the development of agricultural science and technology in China, and made clear that it is not a commercial decision. If Pinduoduo makes approximately RMB2 billion in each coming quarter, which we extrapolated from its average quarterly net profit in 2Q and 3Q of 2021, we estimate that it will likely only break even over the next three to five quarters[2].

JD.com’s business can be divided into retail, logistics and transportation, and newly added businesses, with the retail segment making the biggest contribution to its pool of profits. The other two arms were, however, still in the red[3]. While the retail division’s 3Q21 non-GAAP operating profit margin was relatively stable compared with the same period 2020, investors have to be aware that its increased equity incentive expenses under such accounting standards also led JD.com’s operating profit margin in 3Q21 to fall quarter-on-quarter to 1.2% from 2.5%3.


[1] Source: Alibaba Group, as of Nov 2021

[2] Source: Pinduoduo, as of Nov 2021

[3] Source: JD.com, as of Nov 2021


Disclaimer

This document is based on management forecasts and reflects prevailing conditions and our views as of this date, all of which are accordingly subject to change. In preparing this document, we have relied upon and assumed without independent verification, the accuracy and completeness of all information available from public sources. All opinions or estimates contained in this document are entirely Zeal Asset Management Limited’s judgment as of the date of this document and are subject to change without notice.

Investments involve risks. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. You may lose part or all of your investment. You should not make an investment decision solely based on this information. Each Fund may have different underlying investments and be exposed to a number of different risk, prior to investing, please read the offering documents of the respective funds for details, including risk factors. If you have any queries, please contact your financial advisor and seek professional advice. This material is issued by Zeal Asset Management Limited and has not been reviewed by the Securities and Futures Commission in Hong Kong.

There can be no assurance that any estimates of future performance of any industry, security or security class discussed in this presentation can be achieved. The portfolio may or may not have current investments in the industry, security or security class discussed. Any reference or inference to a specific industry or company listed herein does not constitute a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold securities of such industry or company. Please be advised that any estimates of future performance of any industry, security or security class discussed are subject to change at any time and are current as of the date of this presentation only. Targets are objectives only and should not be construed as providing any assurance or guarantee as to the results that may be realized in the future from investments in any industry, asset or asset class described herein.