Are traditional banks’ days numbered?


Two fintech companies filed for initial public offering late last year – the first being Ant Financials, followed by Lufax, a Ping An Insurance Group subsidiary listed on the New York Stock Exchange. While Ant Financials didn’t eventually go public, its prospectus as well as Lufax’s are valuable resources through which investors can gain insights into the little-known territory of financial technologies.

One of the most frequently asked questions from investors is, “Will digital banks pose a serious threat to traditional banks?” It seems logical to assume so. After all, the rise of novel online business models has pushed many traditional industries to the brink. Most notably, print media and retailers have been under stress due to the shift.

The business model of banks, however, are far more complicated than that of print media or retailers. To begin with, banks are highly leveraged by nature, their influential role in the economy also makes them one of the most regulated industries worldwide. Despite the challenges they face, we think incumbent traditional players are well positioned to defend against emerging internet banks.

Firstly, banks are asset-heavy, so the business models most internet companies have readily adopted – which require only light capital commitment while providing high returns – may not be feasible for digital banks.

Typically banks make money by providing various forms of loans. And they also source income from offering financial services such as facilitating wire transfer, securities transactions and foreign exchange trading. Indeed, internet financial institutions can potentially replace banks in providing similar services. But it’s another story in the loan services department.

For example, the balance sheets of small and medium-sized banks in Hong Kong are made up of various loans and securities holdings, which, combined, are nine times their core capital[1]. This means that a bank needs to increase its core capital by a dollar for every additional 9 dollar of assets it holds. So even if a digital bank is able to expand loan businesses within a short span of time, it would need to amass enough core capital to be compliant of existing regulatory requirements. It also affects the rate at which a bank can grow and that of the return on capital. Understandably, operating a digital bank is entirely different from running a capital-light internet firm in practice.

Moreover, Ant Financials and Lufax are among the Chinese fintech firms that are faced with regulatory challenges despite their capital-light business models. The central government capped the maximum interest rate for personal loans at 24%[2]. In addition, the days when fintech companies operated solely as a loan facilitator is over – they will need to fund no less than 30% of co-lending loans[3]. Such rules, in our view, are likely to curb the growth of these businesses to a certain extent.

Secondly, banks have to bear the cost of bad debt on top of operating cost – a fate from which digital banks can’t escape.

Internet banks may be able to stay lean without being weighed down by the expense of supporting a wide network of brick-and-mortar service points, but traditional banks these days have already shifted most services online, leaving only those that require a face-to-face setting, such as private wealth management, to physical shops. As for the cost of bad debt, we think digital banks hardly have an edge over traditional banks unless they are able to get hold of a unique dataset that provides them accurate insights into borrowers’ credit worthiness.

Take the most common home loan as an example. In other parts of the world, banks would normally send inspectors to conduct due diligence on a property prior to approving a mortgage application for it. Given that the land constitutes only a portion of the overall property value, in the case where the property is a shoddy construction, the mortgage may be undercollateralized if it is benchmarked against the value of surrounding properties. So far, we haven’t seen this being automated among digital banks to reduce costs.

The existence of digital banks in the UK goes further back in time compared with those in Hong Kong, so we took some time to study the annual reports of Monzo Bank to understand its operation model. Interestingly, according to the annual report published in February 2020, Monzo Bank saw deposits grow by 1.5 times within a year, but most were still parked in central banks, while consumer loans accounted for only 7% of its total assets[4]. Monzo Bank also set aside around 14% of consumer loans as expected credit losses, which sat far above traditional banks4. Such level of preparedness shows that, managing credit loss expenses can be trickier than one might have thought.


[1] Source: The Bank of East Asia Annual Report 2019, CMB Wing Lung Bank Annual Report 2019, as of April 2021

[2] Source: Chinanews.com, as of April 2021

[3] Source: Southern Metropolis Daily, as of April 2021

[4] Source: Monzo Bank Annual Report 2020, as of April 2021


Disclaimer

This document is based on management forecasts and reflects prevailing conditions and our views as of this date, all of which are accordingly subject to change. In preparing this document, we have relied upon and assumed without independent verification, the accuracy and completeness of all information available from public sources. All opinions or estimates contained in this document are entirely Zeal Asset Management Limited’s judgment as of the date of this document and are subject to change without notice.

Investments involve risks. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. You may lose part or all of your investment. You should not make an investment decision solely based on this information. Each Fund may have different underlying investments and be exposed to a number of different risk, prior to investing, please read the offering documents of the respective funds for details, including risk factors. If you have any queries, please contact your financial advisor and seek professional advice. This material is issued by Zeal Asset Management Limited and has not been reviewed by the Securities and Futures Commission in Hong Kong.

There can be no assurance that any estimates of future performance of any industry, security or security class discussed in this presentation can be achieved. The portfolio may or may not have current investments in the industry, security or security class discussed. Any reference or inference to a specific industry or company listed herein does not constitute a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold securities of such industry or company. Please be advised that any estimates of future performance of any industry, security or security class discussed are subject to change at any time and are current as of the date of this presentation only. Targets are objectives only and should not be construed as providing any assurance or guarantee as to the results that may be realized in the future from investments in any industry, asset or asset class described herein.

Behind SMIC’s Shanghai listing: A nation-wide tech transformation


Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), whose secondary listing in Shanghai on July 16 raised close to RMB 50 billion – more than double the initial target – will be channeling part of the proceeds towards building the production line of 12-inch semiconductor wafers. The wafers will then facilitate the mass production of 14 nanometer (nm) and 7nm processes[1].

Understandably, a 14nm chip or a 7nm one may not mean much to an ordinary investor given that nanometer is not a measurement unit accessible by the naked eye. While each unit only rounds up to one ten-thousandth of a single hair, it is critical to how advanced a semiconductor foundry is in the industry.

Globally, chipmakers currently possessing the capability of producing high-end chips are far and few between. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) and Samsung are the only two capable of fabricating chips smaller than 7nm. While SMIC’s 14nm process technology has been iterated on Huawei’s smartphone production, it will be a long haul before the company can rival the manufacturing level of TSMC, which makes 5nm chips, and TSMC has set the development of 3nm chips and even 2nm process, in motion.

Why SMIC?

Edging closer to the US presidential election, tensions between US and China have escalated again recently, leading to uncertainty around the bilateral relationships. But what’s clear amid the turmoil is the US’s determination to quashing China’s technology industry.

Following the Trump administration’s ban on telecom company ZTE Corporation and Huawei, it has moved to take aims at Bytedance and Tencent. Under the US embargo, building a local supply chain for the technology industry has never been more important to China. So with semiconductor chips being the life force of the tech sector, having a robust chipmaking industry is a key to China’s quest for technological self-sufficiency.

The domestic tech sector has only begun to gain independence over the past two decades. Before then, China had to rely on imports such as elevator controllers, laser generators or injection molding machines. But China has come to be self-sufficient in manufacturing most of these mid-tier products.

However, China will have to make a breakthrough in the high-tech segment, particularly in information and communications technologies, to continue moving forward. Indeed, it won’t be a walk in the park for China, given that countries in the West have led the development of existing technologies over the years, with a firm grip on various patent rights. It’s difficult enough to decipher existing patents, so getting around them will be yet a more daunting task for China.

In SMIC’s early days, the company’s key management staff, including the former chief executive officer, joined from TSMC. But SMIC suffered a setback after TSMC filed lawsuits in the US in 2003 and 2006 alleging the company of theft of patents. In addition to paying for TSMC’s compensation, SMIC had to stop using contested technologies following court rulings.

How will SMIC catch up with rivals?

When it comes to investing, we look for companies with the 4Rs: Right business, Right cycle, Right price and Right management. So Liang Mong Song, SMIC’s new co-chief executive officer, who managed to raise the production yield – the percentage of non-defective items – of 14nm chips to 95% from 5% just after 300 days of his appointment, has clearly exhibited good management, and will serve to bolster the Chinese chipmaker’s development[2].

Moreover, talents lie at the heart of the tech industry. China boasts a lot of local scientists and engineers, while its R&D investment as a percentage of GDP reached 2.19% in 2018[3]. But the country has only begun rolling out policies recently to back technological research. The spending on the industry was also relatively lower than that of Japan, South Korea, Israel and the European Union. In fact, truly experienced engineers specialised in chipmaking are still considered a scarcity in China.

Owing to laws of physics, there is a limit to how small the distance between transistors in a semiconductor can be. In terms of manufacturing capability, TSMC has already started mass-producing 5nm chips in the second quarter this year, meaning that it is around four to five years ahead of SMIC. But if front runners struggle to maintain Moore’s Law, which suggests that processing power will double about every two years, and fail to narrow the distance between transistors, SMIC will then have time to catch up with rivals. The chipmaking race will be vastly different from how companies compete today, where leading rivals grow simultaneously as you do, posing an insurmountable hurdle for the rest to gain more ground. Though it is not clear yet where the end of Moore’s Law lies.

But of course, luck is also key to technological development. For example, Intel, whose chipmaking technology was once the best in the industry, was overtaken by TSMC over the past year due to a research blunder. The Taiwanese company’s technology lead may well be lost to SMIC or other chipmakers just the same over a slip-up in the future.

Another racetrack

China is completely aware of how difficult it is to play catch-up in the information technology industry. So not only is it investing in areas where it is lagging behind, China is also injecting capital in new technologies, such as electrical vehicles, artificial intelligence and quantum computing. Such novel technologies will then level the playing field for China and the West, raising its chance in becoming the world’s top technology innovator.

In the automotive industry, one-third of the cost of making an electric car goes to the battery, which is basically equivalent to the engine of a conventional gas-powered car. So getting hold of the battery production will be critical to dominating the automotive sector. A foreign news outlet previously reported that a Chinese company has already developed a battery with a lifespan of 16 years, or two million kilometers[4].

New technologies will obviously be important assets to China, but advancing innovation in basic mechanical engineering components is no easy feat. China is still lagging behind western countries in producing ball bearings, an essential part of rotating tools, for example. As such, local engineers will need years of research as well as trial and error – just as those required of experts in the past – before they can achieve the same level of sophistication in making these products, and in the material science behind them. It was only three years ago that China got the hang of producing the balls of ballpoint pens. So given time and perseverance, China will eventually be neck and neck with, or even outpace, other countries in one of the racetracks of technological development.


[1] Source: Wall Street Journal, as of Jul 2020

[2] Source: HKET, as of Jul 2020

[3] Source: World Bank, as of Jul 2020

[4] Source: CNBC, as of June 2020

Disclaimer

This document is based on management forecasts and reflects prevailing conditions and our views as of this date, all of which are accordingly subject to change. In preparing this document, we have relied upon and assumed without independent verification, the accuracy and completeness of all information available from public sources. All opinions or estimates contained in this document are entirely Zeal Asset Management Limited’s judgment as of the date of this document and are subject to change without notice.

Investments involve risks. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. You may lose part or all of your investment. You should not make an investment decision solely based on this information. Each Fund may have different underlying investments and be exposed to a number of different risk, prior to investing, please read the offering documents of the respective funds for details, including risk factors. If you have any queries, please contact your financial advisor and seek professional advice. This material is issued by Zeal Asset Management Limited and has not been reviewed by the Securities and Futures Commission in Hong Kong.

There can be no assurance that any estimates of future performance of any industry, security or security class discussed in this presentation can be achieved. The portfolio may or may not have current investments in the industry, security or security class discussed. Any reference or inference to a specific industry or company listed herein does not constitute a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold securities of such industry or company. Please be advised that any estimates of future performance of any industry, security or security class discussed are subject to change at any time and are current as of the date of this presentation only. Targets are objectives only and should not be construed as providing any assurance or guarantee as to the results that may be realized in the future from investments in any industry, asset or asset class described herein.